



**XXI BOMBER COMMAND**

**GUAM**

0800 8 March 1945

**FROM: COM GEN XXI BOMB COM SECRET**

**TO: COM GEN 73RD BOMB WING COM GEN 313™ BOMB WING COM GEN 314™ BOMB WING**

**FIELD ORDER NUMBER 43. MEETINGHOUSE NUMBER 2.**

1. Omitted.

2. The XXI Bomber Command will attack Urban Area of Meetinghouse with maximum effort on "D" Day. Location: 354 IN -13948E.

3. a. 73rd Wing:

- (1) First A/C will take off at Zero Hour.
- (2) Offset A.P. MPI Course Force 353830N-13953E 354254N-1394745E 312 deg. True 2/3 Same 354205N-1394830E 312 deg. True 1/3
- (3) Altitude of Attack: 7000 to 7800 feet.
- (4) Bomb Load: One squadron - M-47 Incendiary Clusters (scheduled to be dropped first) fused instantaneous nose. Balance of squadrons - E-28 Incendiary Clusters fused to open at 2,000 feet above target.
- (5) Route: Base to 2500N - 14300E to 2715N - 14053E to 3450N - 14000E to 3519N - 14025E to 3532N - 1400430E (IP) to Target to 3350N - 13953E to 3557N - 14033E to Base.
- (6) Altitude Enroute to target: 3000 to 3500 feet.
- (7) 73rd Wing will dispatch two radio-homing aircraft to take off prior to main force and fly between points 3502N -14000E and 3450N - 14000E for 1 hour and 30 minutes for the purpose of transmitting homing signal to main force.

b. 313th Wing:

- (1) First A/C will take off at Zero Hour.
- (2) Offset A. P. MPI Course Force 353830N-13953E 354205N - 1394830E 312 deg. True 1/3 Same 354054N - 1394832E 312 deg. True 2/3
- (3) Altitude of Attack: 6000 to 6800 feet.
- (4) Bomb Load: One squadron - M-47 Incendiary Clusters (scheduled to be dropped first) fused instantaneous nose fuse. Balance of squadrons - E-46 Incendiary Clusters fused to open 2,500 feet above the target.
- (5) Route: Same as 73rd Wing.
- (6) Altitude enroute to target: 4000 to 5000 feet.
- (7) The 313th Wing will dispatch two radio-homing aircraft to take off prior to the main force and to fly between points 3502N - 14000E and 3450N -14000E for 1 hour and 30 minutes for the purpose of transmitting homing signals to main force.

c. 314th Wing:

- (1) First A/C will take off at Zero Hour minus 40 minutes.



- (2) Offset A. P. MPI Course Force 353845N-13948E 354057N - 1394653E 338 deg. True All squadrons
- (3) Altitude of Attack: 5000 to 5800 feet.
- (4) Bomb Load: One squadron - M-47 Incendiary Clusters (scheduled to be dropped first) fused instantaneous nose fuse. Balance of squadrons - E-46 Incendiary Clusters fused to open at 2500 feet.
- (5) Route: Base; 2500N -14300E; 2715N - 14053E; 3052N - 14000E; 3525N - 1395430E; Target; 3550N - 13953E; 3557N - 14033E; Base.
- (6) Altitude enroute to target: 5000 to 5500 feet.

x. (1) Attacking by individual aircraft with minimum interval between aircraft. Plan of attack will be for radar bombing but visual bombing method will be used if possible. If visual bombing is done, bombardiers should endeavor to place an even distribution of bombs over Incendiary Zone #1.

(2) Intervalometer Setting:

- (a) M-47 Incendiary Clusters: 100 feet.
- (b) E-46 and E-28 Incendiary Clusters: 50 feet.

(3) Calibrated airspeed of 240 MPH will be flown by all aircraft on bombing run.

(4) No ammunition will be carried.

(5) If visual release is used, the Aiming Point will be other than a conflagration previously started.

(6) All A/C not equipped with bomb bay tank will salvo immediately after intervalometer has been actuated.

(7) For this mission, pins and car-o-seals may be removed from fuses prior to take off.

4. No change.

5. Communications:

a. (1) Radio silence will prevail enroute to target except in case of an aircraft in extreme emergency.

(2) Four special radio-homing planes, two from 73rd Wing and two from 313th Wing will proceed to predesignated point and orbit for radio homing purposes. Designated radio planes will carry one (1) spare Liaison Transmitter and one (1) spare Liaison Dynamotor. All radio planes will begin transmitting homing signal 20 minutes prior to arrival of main force at designated points. (Reference Regulation 100-37 XXI BomCom). Radio Homing planes will fly designated course for one hour and thirty minutes. The most capable radio operators available will be assigned to the special radio planes. All allocation of planes, altitude, frequency, and identification signals will be:

Unit Altitude Frequency Identification

73rd 24,000 424 Kcs B

73rd 25,000 524 Kcs C

313th 26,000 230 Kcs N

313th 27,000 330 Kcs A

(3) Jamming tactics may be employed by enemy but one frequency of the four should remain open.

(4) Wings will predesignate one plane per squadron as the only plane to submit a Strike Report.



(a) Special Strike Report will consist of time over target (GMT) target bombed, method of bombing, cloud coverage, results obtained, fighter opposition, and flak opposition.

Time T - Over Target (GMT)

Target Bombed P - Primary

Method of Bombing V - Visual

R - Radar

N - Navigation Cloud Coverage 1 to 9 for tenths X for 10/10

Bombing Results

A - General Conflagration

B - Several large fires

C - Many fire

D - Few scattered fires

E - Unobserved Fighter Opposition

A - Heavy

B - Moderate

C - Meager

D - None

Flak Opposition

A - Heavy

B - Moderate

C - Meager

D - None

LEMAY

MONTGOMERY COM GEN XXI BOM COM  
D/OPNS



**313th Bomb Wing Field Order, issued to carry-out above Bomber Command Field Order**

313th Bomb Wing APO 247 FO#10 1700 8 March 1945

Maps: S-501 Long Range Navigation Chart 1:3,000,000.

AAF Aeronauticals 1: 250,000, Sheets 378C, 378D, 389A, 389B.

1.
  - a. No change.
  - b. Atk coordinated with 73rd and 314th Wings. 73rd and 314th Wg will take off at "H" hour and "H" hour minus 40 minutes, respectively, and Atk Urban Area of TOKYO. 73rd Wg altitude enroute 3000 to 3500 feet. Bombs at 7000 to 7800 feet. 314\* Wg altitude enroute 5000 to 5500 feet. Bombs at 5000 to 5800 feet. 73rd Wg Atks same MPI as 505th Gp and another MPI at 354254N -139465E on axis of 312 deg. True. 314th Wg Atks MPI at 354057N - 1394653E on axis of 338 deg. True. Both Wings turn right after bombing. 73rd fiys same course as 313th Wg. All Wgs begin Atk at same time.
2.
  - a. 6th, 9th, 504th, and 505th Gps with maximum force Atk and destroy Urban Area of TOKYO on "D" Day.  
Primary Target : Urban area of TOKYO.  
Secondary Target: Same as primary.  
LRT : None  
Take Off: Instrument;Runway No 1 - straight out 6 min; 90 deg right turn; 3 min; 90 deg right turn; back 7 min.  
Runway No 3 - straight out 5 Min; 90 deg right turn, 2 min; 90 deg right turn; 2 min; 90 right turn; back 6 min. Assembly: None.  
Formation: Ind A/C to Tgt and return.  
Route Out: Base; 2500N - 14300E; 2715N - 14053E; 3450N - 14000E; 3519N - 14025E; 3532N - 140 04'30"E (IP); Target. Pt of Climb: 3430N-14002E.  
Method of Atk: By ind. A/C. Minimum interval.  
TgtElev: 183 feet.  
Maneuver after Atk: Right turn away from Tgt Area. Route Back: Target; 3550N - 13953E; 3537N - 14033E; Base.
3.
  - a. 505th Gp: Take off at "H" Hour on Runway 1.
    - (1) Altitude enroute to Tgt: 4000 feet.
    - (2) Alt of Atk: 6400 feet.
    - (3) Offset AP: 353830N - 13953E.
    - (4) MPI: 354205N - 1394830E
    - (5) Bomb Load:
      - (a) 1st 6 A/C, 1st Sqdn: Max load M-47 Incendiary Clusters (to be dropped first).
        1. Instantaneous Nose Fuse.
        2. Intervalometer setting: 100 feet.
      - (b) All remaining A/C: Max load E-46 Incendiary Clusters
        1. Fuzed to open 2500 feet above Tgt
        2. Intervalometer setting: 50 feet..
    - (6) Homing A/C: Dispatch 1 A/C, Take off at "H" minus 1-hr & 30 min, without bombs, with 2 bombay tanks and 750 Rnds of ammo per gun, to fly at 26,000 ft



- between 3502N - 14000E and 3450N - 14000E for 1 hr 30 min to transmit homing signals as outlined in Par. 5 a.
- (5) (a). b. 9th Gp: Take off at "H" Hour on Runway 3.
- (1) Altitude enroute to Tgt: 4500 feet.
  - (2) Alt of Atk: 6400 feet.
  - (3) Offset AP: 353830N - 13953E.
  - (4) MPI: 354054N - 1394832E.
  - (5) Bomb Load:
    - (a) 1st 6 A/C, 1st Sqdn - Max Load M-47 Incendiary Clusters (to be dropped first).
      1. Instantaneous Nose Fuse.
      2. Intervalometer setting: 100 feet.
    - (b) All remaining A/C: Max Load E-46 Incendiary Clusters.
      1. Fuze to open 2500 feet above Tgt.
      2. Intervalometer setting: 50 feet.
- c. 504th Gp: Take off at "H" Hour plus 30 minutes on Runway 1.
- (1) Alt enroute to Tgt: 4000 feet.
  - (2) Alt Atk: 6400 feet
  - (3) Offset AP: 353830N - 13953E.
  - (4) MPI: 354054N - 1394832E.
  - (5) Bomb Load: Max Load E-46 Incendiary Clusters.
  - (6) Fuzing: To open 2500 feet above Tgt.
  - (7) Intervalometer Setting: 50 feet.
  - (8) Homing A/C: Dispatch 1 A/C as in par. 3. a. (6) above to fly at 27,000 feet.
- d. 6th Bomb Gp: Takeoff at "H" Hour plus 30 Minutes on Runway 3.
- (1) Altitude Enroute to Target: 4500 feet.
  - (2) Alt. Atk.: 6400 feet.
  - (3) Offset AP: 343830N - 1394832E.
  - (4) MPI: 354054N - 1394832E.
  - (5) Bomb Load: Maximum Load E-46 Incendiary Clusters.
  - (6) Fuzing: To open 2500 feet above target.
  - (7) Intervalometer Setting: 50 feet.

DAVIES

COM GEN 313 BOM WG



## Maj. Gen. LeMay's Strike Report to Pentagon

### MISSION SUMMARY Mission Number 40

1. Date: 9 March 1945
2. Code Name: Meetinghouse #2
3. Target: Tokyo Urban Area
4. Participating Units: 73rd, 313th, 314th Bombardment Wings.
5. Number A/C Airborne: 325
6. % A/C Bombing Primary: 86% (279 Primary, 0 Secondary, 5 Last Resort, 15 Opportunity)
7. Time over Primary: 100107K - 100400K
8. Altitude of Attack: 4,900 - 9,200
9. Weather Over Target: 3/10
10. Total A/C Lost: 14
11. Resume of Mission: 469,146,000 square feet destroyed or damaged (1,080 acres - 16.8 square miles).

Bombing results excellent. Twenty-six aircraft non-effective. One A/C lost to AA, one aircraft lost to Survey, five aircraft ditched and seven aircraft lost to reasons unknown. Enemy air opposition weak - 40 attacks, no claims. AA moderate to intense and accurate. Average bomb load 13,880 lbs. 73rd Wing, 12,857 lbs. 313\* Wing, 9,673 lbs. 314th Wing, (not stated) Average gas reserve 1,044 gallons.

As soon as time allowed, XXIst Bomber Command units started a series of written reports (beginning at the Squadron Level) which worked its way up the chain of command, until a formal written report from XXIst Bomber Command was made to the Commanding General, 20th Air Force (Gen. of the Army Henry H. Arnold). General LeMay's report follows.

Gen. LeMay's Report of Operations, 10 March 1945

To: Commanding General, 20th Air Force, Washington 25, D.C.

#### 1. Identification of Mission

- a. Field Order #43, Hq. XXI Bomber Command, dated 7 March 1945 directed 73rd, 313th, and 314th Bombardment Wings to take part in the Command's first incendiary attack on



9/10 March 1945.

**b. Targets Specified:**

- (1) Primary Target: Urban area of Tokyo as outlined on attached XXI Bomber Cmd Target Chart 7.
- (2) Because of the type of mission planned extended over such a large urban area, no secondary or last resort targets were specified.

**2. Strategy and Plan of Operations:**

**a. Selection of D-Day:** The weather forecast presented to the Commanding General for 9 March predicted good bombing conditions for the target as well as good base and route conditions. Firm decision was then made to inaugurate the planned low altitude night offensive against targets on Honshu with this mission on Tokyo.

**b. Importance of Target:** Tokyo, one of the world's three largest cities with a population of 7,000,000 (1940 population figure), is the hub of Japanese industry and commerce. With the exception of heavy industry, the city has substantial portions of almost every Japanese business enterprise. Concentrations of such key war industries as machines and machine tools, electronics, precision instruments, petroleum, and aircraft and aircraft parts are within the city limits. Tokyo is also a vital transportation and communications center and the terminus of a majority of the main railroads on the island of Honshu. In addition, it is the administrative seat of government and of the great industrial concerns which comprise Japan's war machine.

**c. Details of Planning - Operational:**

(1) Selection of Aiming Points: The following four aiming points were selected:

Number 1 (354254N -1394745E), near the center of one of the most inflammable parts of the zone, had virtually no firebreaks.

Numbers 2 and 3 (354205N- 1394830E) and (354054N- 1394832E) were east of the Sumida River and would insure an equal density bombs on the central three-quarters of the zone.

Number 4 (354057N - 1394653E) was bounded on the west by the Tokyo Station; on the east by the Sumida River; by the Ginza (commercial) district on the south; and by the Imperial Palace on the north. Equal force assigned to each point to make certain that the average density of bombs would be greater than the minimum requirement of 60 tons of incendiaries per square mile for the entire zone. (Aiming points and assignment of forces are shown on XXI Bomber Command Radar Navigation Chart following the Tactical Narrative.)

(2) Bombing Plans:

(a) Bombardier's Planning:

L Although this mission was directed against a large area, precision bombing was required in order



to start conflagrations of a size that would overcome Tokyo fire defenses. Since predicted wind was from 280 degrees, the bombing sequence planned was from east to west to prevent smoke from obscuring aiming points previously bombed. Bombardiers were instructed to drop bombs on points adjacent to previous fires.

**(b) Determination of Bomb Load:**

L Selection of bombs and fuzes for this mission was influenced by the availability of incendiary bombs and clusters and suitability of munitions insofar as penetration, fire setting properties, and stowage were concerned.

(3). The first squadron of each wing was to carry AN-M-47A2 bombs, multiple suspended six per 500-pound station with instantaneous nose fuzing for use as pathfinder munitions. This type of bomb would set up immediate appliance fires which would mark recommended aiming point for succeeding aircraft. Multiple suspension allowed maximum loads to be carried to insure placing the maximum amount of incendiary material on the target in minimum time. The M-47 was chosen to assure good penetration and initial fire-spread of sufficient size to tie-up the enemy's fire fighting equipment and increase the potential effectiveness of smaller bombs to be dropped by later planes.

(4). All other squadrons were to carry 500-pound clusters containing M-69 bombs. This type chosen because of penetrating power and fire-raising capabilities, coupled with the large number of expected hits, was considered superior to other available bombs. The 73rd Wing was to carry E-28 clusters fuzed to open 2000 feet above the target, while the 313th and 314th Wings were to be loaded with E-46 clusters fuzed to open at 2500 feet. The 2000 and 2500 feet fuzing altitudes were selected because density from individual plane patterns was expected to be greater than from higher openings and the striking velocity obtained would be sufficient for penetration of target. These opening altitudes also made possible the use of existing bombing tables.

(5.) Intervalometer settings planned were 100 feet for the M-47 bombs and 50 feet for the clusters. The M-47 setting was based on the fact 6 bombs were to be released on each station and the individual plane density would be sufficient to start appliance fires in the area approximately 3000-4000 feet in length. The M-69 setting was planned so that an expected density from each plane would set appliance fires over an area 300 feet by 1500 to 2000 feet and would assure dropping a minimum of 25 tons of actual M-69 bombs per square mile.

3. Navigation Planning: All aircraft were to fly individually, requiring no assembly points.

Route Reason for Choice





Base to 25/OON - 143/53E to This route was planned to avoid Iwo Jima operations by 75 miles

27/15N - 140/53E to Nishino-Shima used as radar navigation aid. Route close to Nanpo Shoto Islands permitted use of AN/APQ-13 radar as navigational aid.

35/50N - 140/OOE to This point west of landfall to allow Navigators to make proper orientation before making landfall, to avoid possibility of flying beyond Chosi Point.

35/19N - 140/25E to Landfall point designated was distinguishable on radar scope and made a common course with briefed axis of attack.

35/36N -140/08 to Chiba used as initial point because its location on Tokyo Bay provided good land-water contrast for both radar and visual identification. Target Tokyo urban area.

35/50N - 139/53E to This sharp right turn off target planned to avoid heavy Tokyo air defenses

35/37N - 140/33E to To avoid flak areas on return route, land's end picked south of Chosi Point.

Base Allows navigators to use Bonins and Northern Marianas as radar and visual check points. Route to base was to be as desired.

73rd and 313th Wings instructed to dispatch 2 each radio-homing aircraft to take-off prior to main force and to transmit homing signals for a period of 1 hour and 30 minutes to the later aircraft. The 4 aircraft were to fly between the following points: 35/02N - 140/OOE and 34/50N - 140/OOE.

#### 4. Flight Engineering Planning:

(a) Planes of the 73rd and 313th Wings were not to carry bombay tanks. Wing and Center Wing tanks were to be filled to capacity for a total fuel load of approximately 6800 gallons per plane.

(b) 314th Wing was to carry, in addition to the gasoline load listed above, 1 full bombay tank for a total fuel load per plane of approximately 7300 gallons.

(c) No maximum or minimum bomb loads were specified.

(d) It was estimated the average bomb load per plane of the 73rd and 313th Wings (14,000 lbs.) would assure a safe fuel reserve.

(e) Because of the greater distance to be flown by the 314th Wing, the average bomb load was estimated as 10,000 pounds.

(f) No ammunition was to be carried by any aircraft.

#### (5) Radar Planning:

(a) Radar landfall (34/50N - 140/OOE) was same for all planes because of the good land-water contrast checkpoint.

(b) From landfall, the 313th Wing's course paralleled the Tokyo Bay coastline to the initial point, a peninsula easily identified by its land-water contrast. The offset aiming-point Susaki Airport, was also selected for its easily distinguishable radar features.



(c) From landfall, the 73rd and 313th Wings used a different route, easily identifiable for radar navigation purposes. They were given another peninsula on Tokyo Bay, however, as an initial point. The offset aiming point for these Wings, the mouth of the Edo River, could be identified by radar from any direction.

(6) Radar Counter Measures: Routine search was to be made for every radar signal on frequencies between 100 me and 3,000 me by 2 Radar Observers.

(7) Air-Sea Rescue Planning:

(a) The Navy was furnished with the details of the mission and requested to furnish available facilities for air-sea rescue purposes.

1. For submarines assigned to lifeguard duties were stationed as follows: 34/50N - 140/40E, 34/OON -141/OOE, 33/OON -141/20E and 32/OON - 141/40E.

2. Three surface vessels were directed to be at the following positions: 25/OON - 143/OOE, 20/OON -144/30# and 18/OON - 145/15E. They were to remain on-station from 091000Z to end of mission.

3. Two Dumbo airplanes were assigned the following stations: 23/OON - 144/OOE from 09100Z until end of mission and one at a point 10 miles east of Agrigan Island from 091000Z to 091500Z.

4. Picket boats and crash boats were assigned to carry out air-sea rescue work during the critical periods of take-off and landing until relieved by the Control Tower.

(b) This command assigned 4 Super-Dumbo airplanes (B-29's) to orbit the following positions: 33/OON -141/20E, 32/OON - 141/40E, 34/OON - 141/OOE and 23/OON - 144/OOE. They assisted in spotting, receive distress signals, drop emergency equipment, and direct submarines if air-sea rescue facilities required.

c. Details of Planning - Intelligence:

(1) Enemy Air Opposition:

(a) Enemy Order of Battle estimates indicated that there was a force of 312 single-engine and 105 twin-engine fighter-type aircraft in the Tokyo Area.

(b) Applying a 70 percent operational factor to these figures, it was then estimated that Japanese Air Force capabilities were 292 fighter-type aircraft.

(c) However, study of Japanese capabilities in night-fighter interception, radar, and fighter-searchlight teams, coupled with the surprise element of this type of mission, did not indicate that effective opposition would be met, or that the plan as heretofore discussed would need to be altered.

(2) Enemy Antiaircraft:

(a) It was recommended that attacking from altitudes between 5000 and 7000 feet, was an optimum altitude for reducing effectiveness of both 331 heavy guns and approximately 307 automatic weapons in the Tokyo defenses.

(b) Searchlight and barrage balloon considerations did not enter into the planning for this mission. Although the Tokyo



area has approximately 150 searchlights, 80 of which are believed to be radar controlled, they are not of the effective "spread beam" type for tracking low flying targets. Only a few barrage balloons have been observed in the area.

(c) Routes recommended for attack were on courses north to northeast, i.e. across Chika Peninsula, Tokyo Bay to Tokyo, to place aircraft within the heavily defended areas for the shortest possible time.

3. Execution of the Mission:

a. Take-off: Take-off was scheduled for 0815Z for the 73rd and 313th Wings and for 0735Z for the 314th Wing. Actual takeoff was accomplished as follows:

Aircraft	First Aircraft	Last Aircraft
Wing	Airborne	Take-off
73rd	161	0815Z 0929Z
313th	110	0815Z 1010Z
314th	54	0736Z 1010Z
XXI B.C	325	0736Z 1010Z

No take-off difficulties were experienced.

b. Route Out: Because of excessive turbulence and excessive cloud cover at altitudes flown (from 1000 to 5000 feet), navigators had considerable difficulty obtaining celestial readings. Winds were stronger than predicted. Landfall, coast initial point, and off-set aiming point were all easily identified, as predicted. Several aircraft made landfall at Chosi Point and made no attempt to turn west to Tokyo, but instead bombed Chosi Point and turned southward to base.

c. Over Target:

(1) Primary Target: Clouds encountered were 3/10 strato-cumulus, between 3000 and 5000 feet with top of haze layer at 7,000 feet. Visibility at target was initially 10 miles, but for later planes this was reduced to zero due to smoke. Of the 279 aircraft that bombed the primary target, 5 dropped on lead airplanes, 125 bombed visually, and 149 bombed by radar. A total of 1665 tons of incendiary bombs was dropped from altitudes of 4900 to 9200 feet from 1507Z to 1800Z.

(2) Last Resort Target: 15 B-29s dropped 87.54 tons of incendiaries on following last resort targets:

No. of Aircraft	Group	Target	Tons
2	498	Mito,Nikko	14.00
1	498	Unknown	6.00
1	499	Chosi	6.60
5	500	Tateyama-Hato	
		Chosi	
		Sendai	32.70
2	504	Chosi	
		Katsura	11.80
1	19	Unknown	4.80
3	9	Unknown	11.64



(3) Targets of Opportunity: Five aircraft dropped 12.66 tons of bombs on 2 targets, as follows:

No. of Acft.	Group	Target	Tons
1	9	Chosi	7.76
4	505	ChichiJima Agrihan Auguan	4.90

d. Route Back: After bombing aircraft returned by the most direct route, as briefed. Weather was similar to that encountered on the route out.

e. Landing:

(1) Aircraft landed at bases with 5/10 cumulus cover between 1800 and 6000 feet, visibility 15 miles:

Wing No.	A/C	First Landing	Last Landing
73rd	160	2157Z	0227Z
313th	107	2110Z	0212Z
314th	46	2245Z	0050Z
Total:	313	2110Z	0227Z

(2) Losses: Totaled 14 and were due to following reasons:

- (a) Enemy Aircraft: None.
- (b) Enemy Anti-aircraft: 2
- (c) Accidents and Mechanical: 1 (lost to survey)
- (d) Other and Unknown: 7 (1 lost to survey)

f. Operations Summary:

(1) Navigation: Despite the cloud cover and turbulence encountered, landfall, coast initial point, and off-set aiming point were easily identified on the AN-APQ-13. Pathfinder aircraft were generally non-effective, with signals ranging from good to completely jammed.

(2) Bombing: Bombing results were considered superior. The first aircraft easily located their aiming points and those that followed were able to see fires despite dense smoke. Heat from fires created turbulence that hampered later aircraft. It was found that B-10 shackles caused many release failures of the M-47 clusters and in the future it is planned to use only B-7 shackles with this type cluster.

(3) Flight Engineering: The cruise over the target was accomplished at planned air speed without difficulty. Average fuel used to return from the target at 7000 to 8000 feet, compared to returns at 25000 feet and above, was approximately 125 gallons more per aircraft. Average fuel reserves per plane were greater than anticipated, indicating greater bomb loads could have been carried. A marked improvement in engine operations was noted, probably due to cool outside night air temperature and the low power settings required by the mission.

(4) Radar: Wind determination was difficult due to inexperience of radar operators in low level work. A maximum range of 230 nautical miles on the newly installed X-band Loran was reported.



(5) **Gunnery:** No gunnery was employed against the enemy on this mission with the exception of approximately 500 rounds fired at some searchlights.

(6) **Air-Sea Rescue:** Four B-29s ditched, with a total of 40 survivors being picked-up.

g. **Weather:** Although the forecast was good, weather between 30 degrees north and 34 degrees north was much more severe than forecast. Winds were higher than forecast.

Weather conditions at bases were good, h. **Communications:**

(1) **Radar Counter Measures:** No offensive counter measures were employed. The search indicated that the Japanese have 10-cm equipment and are using it to fair advantage.

(2) **Communications:** Jamming was reported on all Strike Frequencies. Discipline was good by the 73rd and 314th Wings. The 313th reported security unsatisfactory and that corrective action is being taken.

i. **Intelligence Summary:**

(1) **Enemy Air Opposition:** Enemy air opposition was weak, 74 enemy fighters making 40 attacks. No B-29s were lost or damaged due to enemy aircraft action. Nick was reported firing what appeared to be 37-mm tracer or incendiary ammunition. No claims against enemy aircraft were made.

(2) **Enemy Anti-aircraft:** Two B-29s were lost and 42 damaged by anti-aircraft. Based on RCM intercepts, it is believed that the enemy had early warning of the attack. Intense and accurate flak was reported in the target area and from ships in Tokyo Bay. However, anti-aircraft fire, diminished in fire power and accuracy as each succeeding plane came in over the target. Searchlights were reported effective at the start, but became less effective. Those on ships in the Bay were reported as very accurate. Some colored beams were reported.

(3) **Bombing Results and Damage Assessment:** Interpretation of photographs obtained on 11 March 1945 assessed visible damage at 440,146,000 square feet, or 15.8 square miles of city area destroyed. Eighteen percent of the industrial and 63 percent of the commercial districts were destroyed along with the heart of the residential district. In Incendiary Zone No. 1, destruction totaled 82 percent. Twenty-two industrial target numbers and many other unidentified industries were destroyed or damaged.

Curtis E. LeMay  
Major General,  
U.S.A. Commanding